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Abstract: In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein famously criticizes
Frege’s conception of assertion. “Frege’s opinion that every assertion contains an
assumption”, says Wittgenstein, rests on the possibility of parsing every assertoric
sentence into two components: one expressing the assumption that is put forward
for assertion, the other expressing that it is asserted. But this possibility does
not entail that the “assertion consists of two acts, entertaining and asserting” –
any more than the possibility of rendering assertions as pairs of questions and
affirmative answers entails that they consist of questions. Frege scholars protest
that such criticism is inappropriate, not only because Frege doesn’t speak about
assumptions, but also – and crucially – because Wittgenstein fails to address the
logical nature of assertion as reŕected in Frege’s use of the judgment stroke. They
seem to read Wittgenstein’s argument in the light of a remark in the Tractatus
saying that the judgment stroke is “logically meaningless” because it simply
indicates that the author holds the propositions marked with this sign to be true.
In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein’s criticism of Frege is not that the latter’s
conception of judgment and assertion contains a corrupting psychological element.
Rather, the criticism is that for Frege judgment and assertion are composed of
two separate acts, i.e. an act of referring to a truth value and an act of determining
which of the two it is. Through a detailed examination of the “black-spot analogy”
in the Tractatus, I want to show that Wittgenstein presents a serious objection to
Frege’s conception of judgment and assertion.
1 Introduction
The notion of judgment is essential to Frege’s conception of logic. He considers
judgment to be a “logically primitive activity” (Frege 1979: 15) and introduces a
special symbol for it in order tomake judgments recognizable in logical derivations.
Indeed, the “judgment stroke” represents such an important discovery for Frege
that he wishes to have cited it in őrst place when responding to the question “What
may I regard as the Result of my Work?” (Frege 1979: 184).
For all his admiration for Frege’s work, Wittgenstein doesn’t share Frege’s
enthusiasm, and both in early and late periods he expresses reservations about
Frege’s conception of judgment. Ignoring certain subtleties such as that Frege
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distinguishes between judgment and assertion, or that he only calls the vertical
part of the complex symbol “judgment stroke”, Wittgenstein disapproves of the
logical signiőcance of assertion and its representation in logical symbolism.He says
that “assertion is merely psychological” (Wittgenstein 1913: 95) and that “Frege’s
‘judgment-stroke’ ‘ ’ is logically quite meaningless” because it simply indicates
that the author holds the propositionsmarked with this sign to be true (TLP 4.442).¹
Wittgenstein’s negative verdict seems to be repeated in ğ22 of Philosophical
Investigations, where he discusses “Frege’s opinion that every assertion contains
an assumption”. The assertion sign turns out to be “superŕuous” if its function is
to indicate assertion, since the speciőcation of what is asserted characteristically
takes the form of an assertion already. Wittgenstein grants that the “assertion sign”
can be used to distinguish assertions from questions, őctions or assumptions, but
it is a mistake to think of assertion as composed of two separate acts, one of which
is represented by the judgment stroke.
Dummett made no bones about his take on these considerations: “The con-
fused objection of Philosophical Investigations, ğ22, is not to the point” (Dum-
mett 1991: 247). And many Frege scholars seem to share this negative assessment.
For one thing, Wittgenstein still seems to slide over the complexity of the assertion
sign as well as the fact that for Frege it is not “assumptions” but thoughts that are
put forward as true in judgments and assertions.² For another, it has been objected
that Wittgenstein’s criticism misőres because it completely ignores the normative
dimension judgment. Frege’s notion of judgment is essentially normative, since
the judgments he is dealing with are made on the grounds of other judgments in ac-
cordance with logical laws as the “guiding principles for thought” (Frege 1964: xv).
Against this background, the judgment stroke is anything but superŕuous, since
far from indicating what anyone holds to be true, it indicates what everyone should
acknowledge as true.³
Can Wittgenstein’s objection be defused by highlighting the link between
Frege’s notion of judgment and norms for logical inference? Does Wittgenstein
1 Wittgenstein’s hostility echoes in a letter from Philip Jourdain, who asks Frege for permission
to publish some passages from Grundgesetze in The Monist, assuring him that Wittgenstein has
agreed to check the translation: “Also, will you tell me, [. . . ] whether you now regard assertion
( ) as merely psychological” (Frege 1980: 78).
2 This has given rise to the suspicion that Wittgenstein targets Russell’s Frege, rather than Gottlob
Frege, since Russell portrays Frege as thinking that judgments consist of assumptions (Russell 1903
ğ477); see Anscombe 1959: 105.
3 Among the interpreters who try to dissolve the tension between the logical role of Frege’s
judgment stroke and the threat of psychologism in valuable ways are Smith 2000, Greimann 2000,
Taschek 2008, Textor 2010, Pedriali 2017 and van der Schaar 2018.
Bereitgestellt von | provisional account
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 09.01.20 10:24
Wittgenstein and Frege on Assertion | 171
really complain about a corrupting psychological element in Frege’s conception
of logic? The fact that he doesn’t sound particularly hostile when he claims that
assertion is merely psychological suggests that the core of his objection doesn’t
concern psychologism at all. Admittedly, one easily gets this impression when
reading ğ22 of the Investigations in the light of Wittgenstein’s negative remark in
the Tractatus. However, whatWittgenstein, early and late, reject is Frege’s idea that
“the assertion consists of two acts, entertaining and asserting” (PI ğ22). Defending
Frege against this charge is more difficult than showing that the judgment stroke
is not logically superŕuous. In order to avoid barking up the wrong tree, therefore,
I suggest getting a proper understanding of Wittgenstein’s criticism by reading
his objection in the Tractatus in the light of ğ22 of the Investigations. Before that,
however, we need to deőne clearly the proper target of Wittgenstein’s criticism, viz.
Frege’s view of assertion.
2 A Problem for Frege’s Conception of Assertion
For Frege, the distinction between thought, judgment and assertion is crucial. He
famously distinguishes between “the grasp of a thought – thinking, the acknowl-
edgement of the truth of a thought – the act of judgment, the manifestation of
this judgment – assertion” (Frege 1918a: 62). The difference between the content
of a judgment and the acknowledgment of its truth is logically relevant and thus
has to be expressed in Begriffsschrift, in which “everything that is necessary for
a valid inference is fully expressed” (Frege 1879 ğ3). Frege uses a horizontal line
to express that a content is “judgeable” ( A), and he draws a vertical line at
the left end of the horizontal line to express the recognition of its truth ( A). In
order to paraphrase the difference in natural language, Frege suggests reading the
former as “the circumstance that A” and the latter as “the circumstance that A is a
fact”. The complex symbol “ ” is something like “the common predicate for all
judgments” (Frege 1879 ğ3).⁴
In order to explain the difference between content and judgment, Frege makes
essential use of nominalizations. For example, the content of the judgment that
Archimedes was killed at the capture of Syracuse is expressed as “the violent death
of Archimedes at the capture of Syracuse”, or some other nominalization that goes
4 The comparison must be taken with a pinch of salt, since Frege dispenses with the grammatical
distinction between subject and predicate, distinguishing instead between function and argument.
Taken at his word, the “single predicate for all judgments, namely ‘is a fact’ ” (Frege 1879 ğ3) would
turn out to be logically irrelevant.
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with “. . . is a fact”, and makes it clear that we are not yet dealing with a judgment.
However, this early conception of judgment is exposed to two objections. First,
the distinction between assertables and unassertables seems to be ad hoc; e.g.,
nominalizations such as “the death of Cesar” can be asserted, but nouns such as
“house”, “the number 2” as well as propositions involving vague concepts can’t,
as they don’t express assertable contents. As we will see later, this problem does
not arise on Frege’s mature conception of the content of a judgment.
Second, and more importantly, Frege faces a grammatical dilemma: If the
content of a judgment is to be expressed by the use of a nominalization, then
the content is nothing that can strictly speaking be judged. Grammatically, nom-
inalizations introduced with “the circumstance that . . .” function like names or
other noun-phrases whose function is referential rather than expressive. If, on the
other hand, the content of a judgment is not nominalized but paraphrased with
a sentence in the indicative mood, then the content is assertoric and there is no
point in adding the judgment stroke. Therefore, the content of a judgment is either
nominalized and hence unőt for being the subject of a possible judgment, or it is in
the indicative mood and thereby steals the judgment stroke’s thunder. To be clear,
the cause of this predicament resides in Frege’s proposal on how to paraphrase the
difference between content and judgment. Frege’s development of his semantic
theory of sentences and names in the early 1890s should allow him to cope with
this problem too.
According to Wittgenstein, however, the dilemma just outlined is not merely
a problem of the paraphrase, but rather a problem of what is so paraphrased.
Immediately after hismisleading remark about Frege’s opinion that every assertion
contains an assumption, he seems to allude to an argument that runs parallel to
Frege’s dilemma:
But “that such-and-such is the case” is not a sentence in our language – it is not yet a
move in the language game. And if I write, not “It is asserted that . . .”, but “It is asserted:
such-and-such is the case”, the words “It is asserted” simply become superŕuous. (PI ğ22)
Although Wittgenstein is not strictly targeting Frege’s nominalizing device “the
circumstance that . . .”, the structure of his argument corresponds to what I called
the grammatical dilemma above. If the content of a judgment or of an assertion
is to be isolatable, such as an assumption that we agree or disagree with, then
the content needs to be expressed in a sentence that is either true or false. But
neither “that p” nor “the circumstance that p” meets this requirement, as with
these phrases one makes no move in the language game; i.e., they can be used
as parts of utterances, but one doesn’t perform a speech act when expressing
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them in isolation. Remedying this deőciency means understanding the content
assertorically, which ipso facto makes the judgment stroke redundant.⁵
According to Baker and Hacker, this predicament already shows that Frege’s
conception of judgment and assertion is incoherent:
Any attempt to represent Frege’s claim that every assertion contains an assumption by
transformations permissible in language is thus subject to contradictory demands. For the
linguistic expression of the contained assumption must both be, and not be, a sentence.
(Baker/Hacker 2005: 80)
However, such general verdict might be premature, as it is essentially Frege’s early
conception of a judgment that causes all the trouble, and so the question naturally
arises whether Frege’s mature conception avoids the dilemma.
3 Does Semantics Come to the Rescue?
With the discovery of the sense-reference distinction and the prior extension of the
notion of a function, Frege modiőes his Begriffsschrift in a way that also affects his
conception of judgment and assertion. The “horizontal” now represents a truth
function, the value of which is the True if the argument is true, and the False in
all other cases (see Frege 1891: 21; Frege 1964 ğ5). Thanks to this function, Frege
no longer needs to stipulate that the content of a judgment is assertable: “ x”
already represents something that can be judged for any meaningful instance of x.
Consequently, “ 2” expresses a judgment just as “ 3 > 2” does.
As is well known, a function whose value is always a truth value is for Frege
a concept. Since the horizontal stands for such a function, the question arises as
to which concept it represents? There is no agreement among Frege scholars on
this point. Some have suggested reading “ x” in the sense of “x is identical to
the True”.⁶ The merits of this reading are obvious: as a relational concept under
which nothing but the True falls, the concept represented by the horizontal applies
equally to assertables and unassertables. However, the proposal faces the problem
5 Just to be clear, Frege can’t possibly agree to paraphrasing “ p” with “it is asserted: p”, as
one is entitled to apply the judgment stroke only to true propositions. Regardless of whether truth
is a norm for assertions, contrary to “ p”, “it is asserted: p” does not entail the truth of p (see
Künne 2009b: 337). Yet, as for the distinction between content and judgment, the tension is real,
since Frege makes demands that are difficult to reconcile. The plausibility of Frege’s distinction
depends crucially on what is “contained” in judgment and assertion.
6 See Walker 1965: 132 and Noonan 2001: 150 for explicit statements of this suggestion; for a
critical but nevertheless approving discussion of the proposal see Greimann 2000: 232.
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that “3 > 2 is identical to the True” is both ungrammatical and assertoric. In terms
of grammar, it won’t help to opt for a metalinguistic alternative, such as “‘3 > 2’ is
identical to the True”, since the expression “3 > 2” in this reading does not refer to
the True but to itself, and hence the value of the horizontal would be the False, not
the True. Moreover, the assertoric mode of the metalinguistic alternative preempts
the role of the judgment stroke.⁷
In order to overcome this second problem, David Bell has suggested reading
“ x” as corresponding to the complex noun phrase “x’s being identical to the
True” (Bell 1979: 23). Thus nominalized, the horizontal can be equally applied to
names and sentences without assertoric import, but in the latter case the resulting
expression still sounds grammatically odd. For how are we to understand the
judgment that 3 is greater than 2, or that Caesar is dead? According to Bell’s
proposal, “Caesar’s death’s being identical to the True is a fact” expresses a true
judgment stating identity between Caesar’s death and the True. But since truth
values are abstract objects, Caesar’s death should also be an abstract object, and
perhaps even more controversially, it should be the same abstract object as the
True. To stay within Frege’s framework, one can say that “Caesar’s death” refers
to the True, just as any other true sentence does (via its sense), but reference and
identity are not one and the same.
Apart from this difficulty, Bell’s proposal departs from Frege’s language use.
In a letter to Husserl, he explicitly says how the horizontal of the modiőed Be-
griffsschrift is to be read: “Instead of speaking of a ‘circumstance’, one should
speak of a ‘truth-value’” (Frege 1980: 64). Unfortunately, the key formulation is
lost in the English translation, since Frege gives precise instructions on how to
speak of a truth value: “Wahrheitswert davon, dass” (Frege 1976: 98). The deő-
nite description “the truth value of (that) x” is applicable to assertables as well
as unassertables without assertoric import and without infringing on grammar.
Hence, Frege’s mature semantic theory seems to provide the resources necessary
to avoid the quandaries related to his early conception of judgment and assertion.
Wittgenstein’s charge, however, is not completely settled, as will be shown
in the next section. But before examining whether Frege’s semantic conception
of judgment and assertion is coherent, let me just highlight an immediate conse-
quence of his modiőed account. If the content of a judgment is referential, insofar
as it is referring to a truth value, then a judgment is by its very nature something
linguistic, since the reference relation essentially holds between a linguistic ob-
ject and something else. Bluntly put, therefore, a judgment for Frege is always
7 Heck/Lycan 1979 conclude from this that it is impossible to determine which concept is repre-
sented by the horizontal.
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about a name’s reference to the True. This may be acceptable for the judgments
made within a framework such as the Grundgesetze, but how does this referential
conception work for judgments that are not put into writing?⁸
4 Wittgenstein’s Criticism in the Tractatus
On Frege’s mature conception, assertion essentially involves reference to a truth
value. When introducing the horizontal and the judgment stroke in Grundgesetze,
he explicitly states that the part of a “proposition of Begriffsschrift” (Begriffsschrift-
satz) that determines the judgment’s content “simply designates a truth-value,
without saying which of the two it is” (Frege 1964 ğ5). He continues to say that
“we therefore need a special sign to be able to assert something as true”. Thus,
it falls to the judgment stroke to say which truth value is denoted by the rest of
a Begriffsschriftsatz. As I read him, Wittgenstein opposes this division of labor
both in the Investigations and in the Tractatus (as well as in Notes on Logic). For a
proper understanding of his objection, however, one has to look at the earlier of
these writings too, since in Investigations he only presents the diagnostics of the
mistake:
Of course, one has the right to use an assertion sign in contrast with a question mark [. . . ]
It is a mistake only if one thinks that the assertion consists of two acts, entertaining and
asserting (assigning a truth-value, or something of the kind), and that in performing these
acts we follow the sentence sign by sign roughly as we sing from sheet music. (PI ğ22)
Wittgenstein seems to grant the use of an assertion sign ( ) for the purpose of
contrasting assertions with other speech acts such as questions and demands.
However, the mistake to which he wants to draw our attention distinctively in
connection with Frege is to think that this contrastive sign would represent the
performance of two separate acts. Since Fregean assertion and judgment essentially
involve the act of referring to a truth value, he seems to be guilty of making this
mistake.
Wittgenstein does not, however, say in this passagewhy the two-stagemodel of
assertion is mistaken. The model could be rejected simply on the intuitive ground
8 It has been argued that “judging that p is attempting to refer to the True, by thinking that
p” (Heck/May 2007: 19). It seems to me that one can maintain the Fregean spirit of this general
proposal only if one is prepared to accept the controversial claim that thought presupposes
language, since Fregean reference is essentially a relation between linguistic signs and their
denotation.
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that in making a judgment or an assertion one is not doing two things in a row,
as one reads note after note when singing from a score.⁹ But Wittgenstein has a
stronger objection to Frege’s model of judgment and assertion, although it occurs
elsewhere and Wittgenstein obviously feels no need to repeat it. The decisive
argument can be found in the Tractatus, where Wittgenstein criticizes Frege’s
notion of truth with a comparison:
Imagine a black spot on white paper: you can describe the spot by saying for each point on
the sheet, whether it is black or white. To the fact that a point is black there corresponds a
positive fact, and to the facts that a point is white (not black), a negative fact. If I designate a
point on the sheet (a truth-value according to Frege), then this corresponds to the supposition
that is put forward for judgment, etc. etc. (TLP 4.063; see also NL B10)
The thought is that a random black stain on white paper representing a totality of
facts can be completely described by, for example, indicating whether each spot is
black or white by means of Cartesian coordinates. In this analogy, each point on
the sheet corresponds to a Fregean truth value, and pointing to a particular spot
corresponds to a Fregean supposition (Annahme). Just as one can point to the color
of, say, J9, so one can refer to the truth value of p. Moreover, just as the reference
to J9 is a substantial component of the judgment that this particular spot is black,
so reference to the truth value of p is a substantial component (on Frege’s terms)
of the judgment that p is true. So according to this comparison, “ p” refers to a
truth value without telling whether it is the True or the False, just as “the color of
x” refers to a color without telling whether it is black or white.¹⁰
However, Wittgenstein thinks that the analogy breaks down because referring
to a truth value is not relevantly similar to pointing at color stains:
But in order to be able to say that a point is black or white, I must őrst know when a point is
called black, and when white: in order to be able to say, “‘p’ is true (or false)”, I must have
9 The two-stage model of assertion is not a strawman’s position and surfaces in many of Frege’s
characterizations. He sometimes describes judgment in terms of “taking steps” (Frege 1892: 34),
“advances from a thought to a truth-value” (Frege 1892: 35), or making a “choice between oppo-
site thoughts” (Frege 1979: 198). The literal interpretation of these characterizations is critically
discussed in Stepanians 1998.
10 Note that “the truth value of p is the True” is an identity statement with deőnite descriptions
on both sides; accordingly, the corresponding sentence in Wittgenstein’s analogy would have to
be “the color of spot x is the color black”. Otherwise, the comparison would not make sense, since
truth values are objects and colors are properties. Whether it is plausible to use “the color of x”
as a referring device that parallels the horizontal’s reference to a truth value seems to be more
problematic and will be discussed below.
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determined in what circumstances I call “p” true, and in so doing I determine the sense of
the proposition.
Now the point where the simile breaks down is this: we can indicate a point on the paper
even if we do not know what black and white are, but if a proposition has no sense, nothing
corresponds to it, since it does not designate a thing (a truth-value) which might have proper-
ties called “false” or “true”. The verb of a proposition is not “is true” or “is false”, as Frege
thought: rather, that which “is true” must already contain the verb. (TLP 4.063; see also NL
B10)
This passage is rich and notoriously difficult to understand, partly because it
contains some elements that do not őt the Fregean picture at all.¹¹Although Frege’s
notion of truth is the declared target of the whole section, it remains unclear, for
example, whether Wittgenstein’s argument builds upon Fregean or Tractarian
sense. Furthermore, according to the conclusion of Wittgenstein’s argument, Frege
allegedly took “is true” (and “is false”) to be the verbof aproposition, thus imposing
a predicational conception of judgment and assertion that Frege couldn’t possibly
accept.¹² Regardless of these incongruities, I am going to suggest a reading of
this section according to which Wittgenstein raises a serious objection to the two-
stage model of judgment and assertion. In my interpretation, the middle section of
4.063 is a straightforward continuation of the analogy because it makes explicit
the similarity between the statement that a particular thought is true and the
statement that a particular color patch is black; i.e., one has to know the conditions
of application for expressions such as “true” and “black”.¹³
Having emphasized the similarity between the color case and the semantic
case at the level of judgment and assertion, Wittgenstein goes on to explain why
the analogy breaks down. One can point to a particular spot on the paper – either
11 Unfortunately, many commentators end up rephrasing this passage instead of elucidating it;
noteable exceptions are Proops 1997: 129ff., Ricketts 2002: 239ff., and Potter 2009: 89ff.
12 For the difference between Fregean and Tractarian sense, see Künne 2009a: 45ff. and
Hacker 2001: 206f.; for the second supposition, see Proops 1997: 131. I will give reasons below why
the predicational conception of judgment is not acceptable for Frege.
13 In this respect, I deviate from Proops, who argues that this paragraph “is not a continuation of
the analogy”, but “presents Wittgenstein’s own views about what it is to have a grasp of the notion
of truth” (Proops 1997: 131). According to Proops, “to sustain the analogy, truth and falsity would
have to be applicable to truth-values, not propositions” (Proops 1997: 143). Yet, this is not a result
of sustaining the analogy but a result of misconceiving judgment and assertion as predicating
truth. In my reading, at the level of judgment and assertion – and that is what the middle section is
about – the color case is similar to the semantic case, regardless of how truth attaches to thought.
Frege can conődently accept what Wittgenstein says in the middle section: one cannot judge a
proposition to be true without determining its sense. It is at the level of thought that the analogy
breaks down, because designating a truth value is in relevant respects not like pointing to a color
patch.
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ostensively or by using Cartesian coordinates – without knowing the application
conditions for such expressions as “black” and “white”. But one cannot designate
a truth value by the use of a sentence without knowing the application conditions
for such expressions as “true” and “false”. The pointing device in the semantic case
may be a sentence or a deőnite description such as “the truth value of x”; either
way, one cannot make use of the device without a prior understanding of what
the device is supposed to refer to. This is in stark contrast to the use of a pointing
device in the color case, because one can make use of a őnger or of coordinates
without knowing anything of the colors of the point thus indicated. Wittgenstein
explains the dissimilarity by alluding to some notion of sense: the target in the
semantic case (truth) surfaces in the requirements for semantic pointing, insofar
as the use of a sentence, for whatever purpose, cannot be detached from grasping
the thought expressed, and grasping the thought is grasping the truth conditions
of the sentence. As I read him, Wittgenstein is not saying that grasping the truth
conditions of a sentence is knowing whether the sentence is true, for this would
obviously forestall the point of judgment and assertion. He seems to make the
more subtle observation that by referring to a truth value with a sentence one has
to make use of the notion of truth as it occurs in judgment and assertion, because
one has to know that the sentence is either true or false. This is where the semantic
case differs from the color case, as pointing to a speciőc spot of a stain can be done
without knowing that it is either black or white.¹⁴
5 Drawing the Right Conclusion
In this last section, I want to discuss the conclusion to be drawn from this argu-
ment. On the one hand, as Künne (Künne 2009a: 57) and others have pointed out,
Wittgenstein’s official conclusion is indeed bewildering, since Frege never said
that “is true” is the verb of the proposition. On the other hand, if the analogy only
14 Thus, the argument does not necessarily presupposeWittgenstein’s notion of sense, as it seems
to be equally valid for logical tautologies, which characteristically lack Tractarian sense. When
grasping the truth conditions of, say, “ (c → (b → a)) → ((c → b) → (c → a))”, one is
computing a large number of conditionals (including a case differentiation) regarding the truth and
falsity of the whole sentence with respect to the truth or falsity of its parts. For these computations
one has tomake tentative use of the notion of truth as it occurs in judgment and assertion. However,
the argument does presuppose that by simply writing down a well-formed formula preceded by
the horizontal one is not referring to a truth value. But this assumption is compatible with Frege’s
demand that it must be possible to express a thought without acknowledging its truth, for by
merely writing down a sentence one has not yet grasped the thought it expresses.
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stresses the fact that judgment and assertion involve grasping truth conditions,
then it is hard to see why this is an objection to Frege. In short, Wittgenstein’s
criticism is either unjustiőed or inconsequential, or so it seems.
Let me begin with the őrst half of the lesson that Wittgenstein officially wants
us to draw: “The verb of a proposition is not ‘is true’ or ‘is false’, as Frege thought[.]”
This conclusion will strike Fregeans as puzzling, since Frege almost always insists
that judgment and assertion are not predications of truth (the only exception is
in Begriffsschrift ğ3; see my footnote 4 above). He famously observes that “the
thought that 5 is a prime number is true” contains the same thought as “5 is a
prime number”, and that the relation of the thought to the True may therefore not
be compared with that of subject to predicate (Frege 1892: 34). So he would oppose
at least the őrst part of Wittgenstein’s conclusion by pointing to the redundancy of
the truth predicate. Moreover, Frege not only thinks that the truth predicate so used
contributes nothing to a thought; he also offers a compelling argument against the
mistaken conception of judgment and assertion as predications of truth:
By combining subject and predicate, one reaches only a thought, never passes from a sense
to its Bedeutung, never from a thought to its truth-value. One moves at the same level but
never advances from one level to the next. (Frege 1892: 35)
This rules out the predicational view of judgment and assertion that Wittgenstein
allegedly ascribes to Frege. Judgment and assertion cannot consist in predicating
“is true” of a thought, for the result of combining thought and truth in terms of
predication yields just another, and more complex, thought. As an account of
judgment and assertion, the predicational view rather amounts to an inőnite regress
at the level of thought than of judgments and assertions, which are at another level
to stay with Frege’s picture (cf. Textor 2010: 637f.).
Wittgenstein’s misrepresentation of Frege’s views harbors the danger of con-
cealing the second part of the lesson to be drawn from the analogy: “that which
‘is true’ must already contain the verb”. The claim is not that the truth predicate
is the verb of the proposition, but rather that that to which such a predicate ap-
plies, whether redundant or not, must already contain some verb. If this is the
conclusion that follows from the analogy, then it must stand independently of
the failed prelude. Whatever “is true” contributes, it cannot make its contribution
to something that doesn’t already contain a verb and thereby is assertable. Re-
garding the dilemma that arises from paraphrasing Frege’s judgment stroke (see
section 2 above), Wittgenstein seems to be willing to accept one of the alternatives,
namely that the content of an assertion is assertoric because of the verb. However,
Frege cannot agree to this conclusion, as it confuses predicating with judging (cf.
Frege 1979: 185). Therefore, if it follows from the analogy that the content of the
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assertion is assertoric, Wittgenstein seems to have a point which seriously threat-
ens Frege’s conception of judgment and assertion, and which is valid regardless of
Wittgenstein’s unfortunate portrayal.
To reiterate, Frege wants to drive a wedge between merely grasping a thought
on the one hand and acknowledging its truth on the other. What is sometimes char-
acterized informally as temporally distinct acts (cf. Frege 1918b: 151; Frege 1979: 7,
138) is formally represented by symbols depicting the logical relation between them.
The representation of an overt speech act of assertion and of its silent counterpart,
a judgment, incorporates the representation of an act whose performance is logi-
cally independent of the őrst type of act. Just as “ p” is a graphical component
of “ p” that has an independent meaning, so the act of grasping a thought, of
referring to a truth value, is a component of judgment and assertion that can be
performed independently of these latter acts. It is precisely this ‘logical anatomy’
that Wittgenstein’s analogy addresses, since it questions the logical autonomy of
truth value reference in Frege’s two-stage model of judgment and assertion. As a
separate act one should be able to perform it without performing the other.
For Frege, judgment and assertion are composed of two separate acts, rep-
resented by the horizontal and the judgment strokes. This makes it comparable
to the two-stage process of pointing to a particular spot on a piece of paper and
telling what color it is. But whereas the color has no bearing on the autonomous
act of pointing at the spot, the act of designating a truth value doesn’t have this
autonomy. For one can only refer to a truth value by means of a proposition that is
either true or false, that is, by the use of a vehicle containing a verb. According to
Wittgenstein then, the two-stage model of judgment and assertion is mistaken be-
cause it conceives of reference to a truth value as a separate act on which judgment
and assertion have no bearing. If truth value designation is a component of making
a judgment, but cannot be described independently from judgment and assertion,
then Frege’s attempt to drive a wedge between designating a truth value ( p)
on the one hand, and the judgment that the thing so designated is identical with
the True ( p), will not succeed. Therefore, it is a mistake to think of judgment
and assertion as containing a separate act of reference to a truth value.
By way of conclusion, I shall brieŕy respond to an objection that has been
raised by one of Frege’smost insightful scholars. In his discussion ofWittgenstein’s
analogy, Wolfgang Künne (Künne 2009a: 55ff.) suggests reading Begriffsschrift-
sätze as pairings of sentence questions and affirmative answers. The idea is taken
from Frege’s remarks about questions as a form of words that can be used to
express a truth without asserting it (Frege 1918a: 62, Frege 1918b: 143 – 147), and it
is launched against Hacker’s negative verdict that there is no such form of words
(Hacker 2001: 211). Künne realizes that for grammatical reasons we cannot simply
paraphrase the judgment that the Earth moves as “Is the Earth moves identical
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with the true? Yes”, and that some kind of nominalization is needed. His proposal
is to parse the judgment as follows: “Is the truth-value of the thought that the Earth
moves identical with the True? Yes.” I consider it to the merit of this proposal that
the paraphrase for the judgment stroke (Yes) applies to something containing a
verb (moves) without rendering the content of the judgment assertoric, as it is
embedded in the wordy nominalization “the truth-value of the thought that . . .”.
However, I see no way of reconciling this proposal with Frege’s function-
theoretic interpretation of the horizontal, according to which simple nouns can
also be used as arguments (see section 3). Does it make sense to ask whether the
truth value of the thought that 2 is identical with the True, if there is no such thing
as the thought that 2? The hesitation at this point could be an indication that
Wittgenstein is not wrong in claiming that assertables should contain a verb – the
grammatical dilemma is hard to overcome. Apart from technical sophistry, Künne
seems to be glossing over Frege’s remark that “a judgement is often preceded
by questions” (Frege 1976: 7), because according to Künne’s own proposal, Frege
should rather have made the general claim that judgments are always preceded by
questions. However, if my interpretation of Wittgenstein’s criticism is conclusive,
then Künne’s proposal seems to be grist to Wittgenstein’s mill. Not only is Künne’s
analysis of judgments as pairings of questions and affirmative answers a clear
manifestation of the two-stage model in terms of two separate speech acts; it also
demonstrates how the speech act of asking a question already draws on the notion
of truth.
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